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JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES. By The American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law. New York: Record
Press. 1965. Pp. xvi, 537. $9.75.

This is a most useful compilation of instructions given by thirtyone federal judges in thirty-three different criminal antitrust suits
in nventy-two different districts of the United States courts during
the period 1923-1964, commencing with United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co.1 It has been prepared by a committee under the
direction of Victor H. Kramer, former Chief of the Civil Litigation
Section of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, who is now
practicing in Washington, D.C. He has had the assistance of a dozen
other lawyers working in the field, and the result is a valuable handbook indeed.
As the editors explain in their introduction, the volume contains
about half of the jury charges given in Sherman Act criminal cases
since 1923. Careful editing has pruned away most repetition. The
editors have inserted within the charges explanatory captions keyed
to an index of legal categories, and have supplied separate tables
classifying the cases by subject-matter and commodity, the names of
the judges presiding, and the respective judicial districts. The canons for selection from the available material, where alternatives existed, were clarity, succinctness, and most recent date (as evidenced
by Judge Van Dusen's charge in United States v. Johns-Manville
Co.2 The editors have also included charges which contain the only
available instruction on a particular substantive question of antitrust law.
The volume thus contains for antitrust lawyers the. best collection of pronouncements from judge to jury on the substantive law
that must instruct and contain the jury's deliberations. The instructions are clothed in the common sense, work-a-day terms necessary for
what Judge Frank called jury-made law, as contrasted with judgemade law.8 From the point of view of the concepts which lurk in
their verbiage, the instructions are spongy and intractable material,
but that is the price one must·pay for the jury trial protected by the
seventh amendment. Balzac, who was not acquainted with the Bill
of Rights, looked on the jury as "nvelve men chosen to decide who
has the better lawyer." However, in many criminal antitrust cases a
jury may be the only common-sense safeguard of the rights of businessmen caught in the Byzantine complexities of the Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman laws, with their innumerable decisional
glosses. It is an unsatisfactory method, as Judge Frank pointed out; 4
I. Cr. No. 32-566, S.D.N.Y. 1922.
2. Cr. No. 21-118, E.D. Pa. 1962.
3. FRANK, I.Aw AND nm MODERN MIND 174 (1930).
4. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-25 (1949).

566

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 64

yet for needless and wrongly motivated prosecutions, the grand jury
may be an ineffective screen, leaving the petit jury as the only protection of the citizen.
The difficulty of the method is illustrated in this book. For instance, the dominating concept of "reasonable doubt" is not very
satisfactorily defined, the best treatment being that in United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 5 in which Judge Ford spoke in terms of
"an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge
under consideration." 6 Some may think this an overstatement. Apart
from the comic definition of the term "reasonable doubt" as "any
doubt that is reasonable" (which one does sometimes find), I have
wondered why it is so hard to make clear to laymen the exact nature
of the concept, and why so many judges find it necessary to define the
phrase in its own terms. The Supreme Court remarked in Miles v.
United States1 that attempts to explain "reasonable doubt" do not
usually result in making it any clearer to the jury; surely it should
be possible to say that a reasonable doubt is an uncertainty or question that survives the application of rational analysis to the evidence.
Yet perhaps these terms suffer from being more complicated than the
words defined-like Sir Thomas Browne's translation of festina
lente as "celerity contempered with cunctation."
It is gratifying to find Judge Lindley expressing the view that aid
to the jury can be given more efficiently by an oral charge which describes the legal questions involved "in as simple terms as possible," 8
avoiding legal terminology. In instructions to the jury, simplicity
and articulation are the two cardinal points. Vagueness and iµisunderstanding arise as much from lack of clear and articulate structure
in the charge as from verbosity and complexity. For instance, the following colloquy at the end of a long charge can only have left the
jury mystified:
Mr. Rothbard: I ask your Honor to say to the jury that if
the jury find the defendants Delta Fish Company and Busky
participated under such circumstances as to furnish reasonable
grounds for apprehending a design to do bodily harm or cause
substantial economic loss, and that there was reasonable ground
for b.elieving the danger imminent and that such design would
be accomplished, they must be acquitted.
The Court: I have given that in substance, except only your
limitation that if they went into it is not correct.
Mr. Rothbard: I did not say that. I said participated.
The Court: If they participated at any time, no. If they parti5. Cr. No. 6670, E.D. Ky. 1940.
6. SECTION OF .ANrrrn.usr LAW, AMERICAN .BAR
ANTJTRUsr CASES 164 (1965) (hereinafter cited as
7. 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880).
8. JURY !NsrRUCTJONS 128-29.

Ass'N, JURY INsrRUCTIONS JN CRJl\llNAL
JURY INsrRUCTIONS).
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cipated from beginning to end under those circumstances.
Mr. Rothbard: That is what I meant.
'
The Court: Then they are not guilty, but if at any time their
participation continued without those circumstances, it is a
different situation.9
The only hope of a jury so instructed is to be allowed to take a
·written copy of the instructions with them to the jury room, as
Judge Eschb~ch permitted in United States v. Standard Oil Co.
(Ind.), 10 and as Judge Caffrey in Massachusetts did with a civil antitrust case. But other judges, like Judge Van Dusen in the JohnsManville case, are disinclined to follow this practice, believing that
it would tend to distract the jury's deliberations into the semantics
of the judge's particular phraseology and destroy the Olympian perspective of the entire case which their collective memory is supposed
to furnish.
This last is the greatest delusion of the whole business, and yetso hard is our predicament-the jury system does offer the best safeguard against abuses in antitrust enforcement through the criminal
law. For the better operation of that system this manual of instructions is an excellent tool.

Ralph M. Carson,
Member of The New York Bar

9. Id. at 61-62.
10. Id. at 437, quoting the charge to the jury in United States v. Standard Oil Co.
(Ind.), Cr. No. 2199, N.D. Ind. 1958.

